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PRE-IMPRISONMENT EMPLOYMENT
DROPS:
ANOTHER INSTANCE OF THE
ASHENFELTER DIP?
CHARLES E. LOEFFLER*
A number of recent studies examining the effects of imprisonment on
ex-prisoner labor market outcomes have reported sizable pre-imprisonment
employment drops. The precise cause of these employment declines has not
yet been identified. The present Article provides evidence that these
geometric declines in employment prior to imprisonment are largely
unrelated to the long-term economic trajectories of the soon-to-be
imprisoned, and instead reflect the mechanical disruption of labor market
activity resulting from pre-imprisonment criminal case processing,
especially pretrial incarceration.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................... 816
I. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE IMPRISONED .................................. 819
II. DATA AND METHODS ........................................................................... 824
III. RESULTS .............................................................................................. 828
IV. DISCUSSION ......................................................................................... 830

*

Thanks to Steven Raphael and the late Robert LaLonde for their helpful comments. Critical
assistance in the collection of the data for this study was provided by David Olson of Loyola
University Chicago as well as Christine Devitt Westley and Jessica Ashley of the Illinois
Criminal Justice Information Authority. In addition, this research would not have been
possible without the cooperation of numerous Illinois government agencies, including the
Circuit Court of Cook County, the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, the
Illinois Department of Corrections, and the Illinois Department of Employment Security.

815

816

LOEFFLER

[Vol. 108

INTRODUCTION
In recent years, researchers and policymakers have increasingly
focused their attention on the employment challenges facing former
prisoners.2 This heightened interest has been driven by the recognition that
ex-prisoners face numerous barriers to employment3 and by the hope that
increasing employment among ex-prisoners could reduce their persistently
high rates of criminal recidivism.4 Underpinning this policy perspective
have been numerous studies estimating the impact that imprisonment has on
the post-release labor market status and performance of ex-prisoners.5 In
2
See JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY
105–23 (1st ed. 2003) (drawing on interviews with inmates, former prisoners, and prison
officials to discuss shortcomings in prisoner reentry services); PRISONER REENTRY AND
CRIME IN AMERICA 1 (Jeremy Travis & Christy Ann Visher eds., 2005) (discussing policies
for prevention of recidivism); BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA
91 (2006) [hereinafter PUNISHMENT]; Bruce Western, The Impact of Incarceration on Wage
Mobility and Inequality, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 526, 528 (2002) [hereinafter Impact of
Incarceration] (noting that the stigma of incarceration, erosion of job skills, and erosion of
social contacts are three key mechanisms explaining why prison and jail time are linked to
slow wage growth).
3
Harry J. Holzer et al., The Effect of an Applicant’s Criminal History on Employer
Hiring Decisions and Screening Practices: Evidence from Los Angeles, in BARRIERS TO
REENTRY?
THE
LABOR
MARKET
FOR
RELEASED
PRISONERS
IN POSTINDUSTRIAL AMERICA [hereinafter “BARRIERS”] 117, 118 (Shawn Bushway et al. eds., 2007)
(discussing multiple barriers for ex-offenders seeking jobs, including diminution of human
capital during incarceration, general reluctance of employers to hire workers with criminal
history records, and legal prohibitions on certain occupations hiring ex-offenders).
4
Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen. Remarks at the European
Offenders
Employment Forum held in Washington, DC (Oct. 8, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/iso/
opa/ag/speeches/2010/ag-speech-101008.html [https://perma.cc/5BYM-YB4C] (noting that
“stable employment is one of the keys to successful reintegration” and that “when quality,
employment-centered programs are made available during and after incarceration, one
demonstration showed they can cut recidivism rates in half”); see generally MATTHEW R.
DUROSE ET AL., BUREAU JUST. STAT., RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN
2005: PATTERNS FROM 2005 TO 2010 (2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rprts
05p0510.pdf [https://perma.cc/TCD4-QGAG].
5
See, e.g., John H. Tyler & Jeffrey R. Kling, Prison-Based Education and Reentry into
the Mainstream Labor Market, in BARRIERS, supra note 3, at 227, 249 [hereinafter PrisonBased Education] (examining effects of “prison GEDs” on post-release labor market
integration); William J. Sabol, Local Labor-Market Conditions and Post-Prison Employment
Experiences of Offenders Released from Ohio State Prison, in BARRIERS, supra note 3, at
257, 297 (examining post-prison employment experience of offenders released from Ohio
state prisons during 1999 and 2000); Haeil Jung, Increase in the Length of Incarceration and
the Subsequent Labor Market Outcomes: Evidence from Men Released from Illinois State
Prisons, 30 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 499, 529 (2011) (examining the impact of
imprisonment on the employment and earnings of male prisoners in the State of Illinois);
Jeffrey R. Kling, Incarceration Length, Employment, and Earnings, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 863,
865 (2006) [hereinafter Incarceration Length] (using an instrumental variable model to
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general, these studies have reported substantial long-term declines in
employment and wages for the formerly imprisoned—declines that have
been linked to changes in prisoner human capital, social capital, and social
stigma.6
Intriguingly, a number of these studies have also reported substantial
employment drops among prisoners prior to imprisonment.7
This
unexpected finding raises the possibility that prisoners might be
experiencing pre-imprisonment labor market difficulties of a kind similar to
those observed among participants in studies of job-training programs.8 In
those studies, job-training program participants were found to have lower
pre-program earnings as a result of employment difficulties that

estimate the impact of imprisonment on employment and earnings); Becky Pettit &
Christopher J. Lyons, Status and the Stigma of Incarceration: The Labor-Market Effects of
Incarceration, by Race, Class, and Criminal Involvement, in BARRIERS, supra note 3, at 203,
204 (examining effect of incarceration on employment and hourly wages in jobs covered by
unemployment insurance through data gathered from individuals who were formerly
incarcerated in a Washington State prison).
6
Western, Impact of Incarceration, supra note 2, at 541. But see Robert Apel & Gary
Sweeten, The Impact of Incarceration on Employment During the Transition to Adulthood,
57 SOC. PROBS. 448, 468 (2010) (finding that ex-prisoners are less likely to search for work
rather than being less likely to find it); Robert J. LaLonde & Rosa M. Cho, The Impact of
Incarceration in State Prison on the Employment Prospects of Women, 24 J. QUANTITATIVE
CRIM. 243, 260 (2008) (reporting that changes in labor market outcomes for female prisoners
are temporary and positive); Kling, Incarceration Length, supra note 5, at 874 (2006) (using
an instrumental-variables model to find that there is little evidence that incarceration has
adverse labor market consequences for the imprisoned in the medium term); Charles E.
Loeffler, Does Imprisonment Alter the Life-Course? Evidence on Crime and Employment
from a Natural Experiment, 51 CRIMINOLOGY 137, 156–58 (2013) (finding that the poor
labor market outcomes of the imprisoned is a state shared by similarly situated nonprisoners, suggesting that prison itself has little to do with the consistently weak labor
market participation of ex-prisoners); David J. Harding et al., Imprisonment and Labor
Market Outcomes: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 124 AM. J. SOC. 49, 49 (2018)
(reporting evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects of imprisonment on labor
employment outcomes by race for a population of Michigan prisoners).
7
See, e.g., LaLonde & Cho, supra note 6, at 247; Jung, supra note 5, at 506–07; Harding
et al., supra note 6, at 68–69.
8
See James J. Heckman et al., The Economics and Econometrics of Active Labor Market
Programs, in 3 HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 1865, 1932 (Orley C. Ashenfelter & David
Card eds., 1999) (examining active labor market policies and discussing methods used to
evaluate their success in integrating the unemployed and economically disadvantaged);
Orley Ashenfelter, Estimating the Effects of Training Programs on Earnings, 60 REV. ECON.
& STAT. 47, 51 (1978) [hereinafter Effects] (reporting entry-into-training-program drops in
employment); Orley Ashenfelter & David Card, Using the Longitudinal Structure of
Earnings to Estimate the Effect of Training Programs, 67 REV. ECON. & STAT. 648, 648
(1985) [hereinafter Longitudinal Structure] (illustrating the use and limitations of
longitudinal earnings data for the estimation of job-training program effects).
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subsequently caused them to enter job-training programs.9
If the
imprisoned were found to be affected by a similar positive selection
process, then it would suggest that even soon-to-be prisoners, with their
often lengthy prior criminal records, were still sensitive to changes in their
labor market status.10 Such a finding would lend support for classic
sociological theories and more recent economic interpretations of criminal
behavior, both of which predict that an individual’s decision to offend is
influenced by their economic position and the unavailability of better
economic alternatives.11 This finding is especially intriguing as the
imprisoned have generally been thought to be less sensitive to changes in
their labor market status due to their more substantial prior criminal
involvement and disengagement from the formal labor market.12 On the
other hand, if labor market participation prior to imprisonment were found
9
See, e.g., Ashenfelter, Effects, supra note 8, at 56–57 (discussing selection bias
problem in data sets for studies on job-training program participation, particularly with
respect to female trainees whose employment status may be the cause rather than the result
of entrance to training).
10
See LaLonde & Cho, supra note 6, at 251 (noting that “the circumstances that make
women more likely to enter prison in any given quarter may also make them less likely to be
employed. . . . [W]e would expect relative employment rates to decline the closer a woman
is to the quarter that she enters prison”); Jung, supra note 5, at 506 (noting that “earnings fall
drastically over the two years prior to incarceration and then rebound immediately following
release,” a phenomenon known as Ashenfelter’s dip).
11
See Robert Agnew, Foundation for a General Strain Theory of Crime and
Delinquency, 30 CRIM. 47, 74–76 (1992) (arguing for the proposition that would-be
offenders choose to commit crimes, especially property crimes, due to the unavailability of
legitimate mechanisms to pursue socially acceptable goals); Albert K. Cohen, The Sociology
of the Deviant Act: Anomie Theory and Beyond, 30 AM. SOC. REV. 5, 10 (1965) (discussing
links between strain and deviance); Richard A. Cloward, Illegitimate Means, Anomie, and
Deviant Behavior, 24 AM. SOC. REV. 164, 176 (1959) (synthesizing anomie and deviance
theories of Durkheim and Merton to formalize the connection between deviancy and blocked
economic opportunities); Robert K. Merton, Social Structure and Anomie, 3 AM. SOC. REV.
672, 672 (1938) (introducing the idea that economic and social position can help explain
why anomie and other forms of social alienation occur).
12
See, e.g., Richard B. Freeman, Crime and the Employment of Disadvantaged Youths,
in URBAN LABOR MARKETS AND JOB OPPORTUNITY 201, 234–35 (George E Peterson ed., 1st
ed. 1992) [hereinafter Disadvantaged Youths] (discussing finding that low unemployment
rates during peak economic opportunities were “insufficient to deter large numbers of
disadvantaged youths from crime”); Richard B. Freeman, The Economics of Crime, in 3
HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 3530, 3541–44 (Orley C. Ashenfelter & David Card eds.,
1999) [hereinafter Economics] (discussing that high rates of unemployment frequently
correlate with increased rates of crime but generally only among individuals who hold a
favorable attitude towards offending); Richard B. Freeman, Why Do So Many Young
American Men Commit Crimes and What Might We Do About It?, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 25,
33–34 (1996) [hereinafter American Men] (criticizing the simplicity of the proposition that
the collapse of the job market for unskilled labor contributed to the rise of criminal activity).
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to be uncorrelated with participation in criminal activities, then there must
be another explanation for the observed employment losses prior to
imprisonment.13 In this Article, I argue for such an alternative explanation.
Specifically, that much of the pre-imprisonment employment losses
observed among the soon-to-be imprisoned can be explained by mechanical
disruption of formal labor market activity as a result of routine preimprisonment criminal case processing, especially pretrial incarceration.
While this finding is of intrinsic interest in its own right, reinforcing the
importance of scrutinizing the labor market consequences of pretrial
incarceration,14 it also has important implications for the estimation of
imprisonment effects. Researchers often rely on data from the months prior
to imprisonment to form the counterfactual condition for a within-person
causal estimate of the effects of imprisonment.15 However, the cooccurrence of pretrial incarceration and imprisonment suggests that this
approach may not produce an isolated estimate of the effects of
imprisonment, but instead a compound estimate of the joint effects of
pretrial incarceration, conviction, and imprisonment if an insufficient lag
structure is employed.
The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. Section I
describes past research on the economic lives of the imprisoned. Section II
describes the analytical strategy and data used in this study. Section III
reports results. And Section IV concludes with a discussion of the
implications of the reported findings.
I. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE IMPRISONED
Both before and after their incarceration, the imprisoned have
consistently been observed to have extremely low levels of employment
and very low wages while employed.16 The Bureau of Justice Statistics
13
See LaLonde & Cho, supra note 6, at 249–50 (discussing possible explanations for the
pattern of declining pre-prison employment rates); Jung, supra note 5, at 506 (noting that
earnings fall drastically over the two years prior to incarceration).
14
See Will Dobbie et al., The Effects of Pretrial Detention on Conviction, Future Crime,
and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 201, 236
(2018) (finding adverse labor market consequences for pretrial detention). For recent studies
on the effects of pretrial incarceration on case outcomes and criminal recidivism, see Paul
Heaton, Sandra Mayson, & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of
Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 728 (2017) (reporting adverse
effects of pretrial detention on case outcomes).
15
Sabol, supra note 5, at 293–94; Tyler & Kling, Prison-Based Education, supra note 5,
at 235; LaLonde & Cho, supra note 6, at 248; Jung, supra note 5, at 511.
16
See Sabol, supra note 5, at 268–72; Tyler & Kling, Prison-Based Education, supra
note 5, at 237; Kling, Incarceration Length, supra note 5, at 867–68; Loeffler, supra note 6,
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reported that prior to their incarceration, U.S. prisoners in 1997 were
between two and three times as likely to be unemployed as the general
population.17 More recent studies of prisoners from Florida, Ohio, and
Washington State have reported pre-imprisonment unemployment rates
ranging from 50% to 74%.18 These exceedingly high levels of preimprisonment unemployment are followed by similar or even higher levels
of long-term post-imprisonment unemployment, suggesting that the
majority of prisoners are chronically unemployed both before and after their
imprisonment.19 This dismal reality has generated considerable interest
among researchers intent on understanding how imprisonment contributes
to the labor market challenges of ex-prisoners20 and among policymakers
hoping to boost the post-imprisonment labor market attachment of exprisoners, with the expectation that doing so might reduce the persistently
high levels of criminal recidivism also observed among ex-prisoners.21
In spite of this recent interest in the relationship between
imprisonment and employment, scholars have generally not examined the
pre-imprisonment labor market experiences of prisoners in great detail.
Most recent studies of the labor market effects of imprisonment report very
little information on how employment and wages of soon-to-be imprisoned
sample members vary over time.22 Intriguingly, however, for those studies

at 157; Becky Pettit & Christopher J. Lyons, Incarceration and the Legitimate Labor
Market: Examining Age-Graded Effects on Employment and Wages, 43 LAW & SOC. REV.
725, 741–42, 750 (2009); CAROLINE HARLOW, BUREAU JUST. STAT., EDUCATION AND
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS 1, 10 (2003).
17
CAROLINE HARLOW, BUREAU JUST. STAT., supra note 16, at 10.
18
Pettit & Lyons, supra note 5, at 210; Sabol, supra note 5, at 268; Tyler & Kling,
Prison-Based Education, supra note 5, at 237.
19
See Pettit & Lyons, supra note 16, at 750; Kling, Incarceration Length, supra note 5,
at 867–88; Pettit & Lyons, supra note 5, at 210; Sabol, supra note 5, at 268; Tyler & Kling,
Prison-Based Education, supra note 5, at 236–37.
20
See Introduction to BARRIERS, supra note 3, at 2–6 (suggesting that greater use of
incarceration may confine less-educated individuals to a secondary labor market that is
characterized by low wages and erratic employment); Apel & Sweeten, supra note 6, at 449
(examining whether currently existing penal policies produce worse life outcomes for
incoming offenders than they did in earlier decades); Pettit & Lyons, supra note 16, at 727
(examining age-graded effects of incarceration on post-release employment and wages in era
of prison expansion); PRISONER REENTRY AND CRIME IN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 209
(examining the realities of prisoner reentry at the peak of the era of mass incarceration);
BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT, supra note 2, at 199 (exploring how incarceration and
related practices contribute to social and economic inequality in the United States).
21
Holder, Remarks at the European Offenders Employment Forum, supra note 4 (stating
the Department of Justice’s dedication to reentry programs focused on employment
opportunities to reduce recidivism).
22
See, e.g., Loeffler, supra note 6, at 157.
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that do report such information, employment declines have been
consistently observed beginning at least several quarters prior to
imprisonment.23 Rosa Cho and Robert LaLonde hypothesized that this
pattern could be caused either by pre-imprisonment incarceration in county
jails or by other changes in life circumstances correlated with entry into the
prison—framing the basic alternatives to be tested in the present study. 24
Further, Haeil Jung suggested that the pre-imprisonment employment
declines observed in his sample of male prisoners were similar to those
observed in studies of job-training and other means-tested social welfare
programs.25 None of these studies, however, have attempted to identify the
specific causes of these precipitous declines in employment prior to
imprisonment nor have they considered the larger methodological
implications for the estimation of imprisonment labor market effects.
The absence of a more substantial examination of the preimprisonment labor market experiences of prisoners is surprising, since the
quarters immediately prior to imprisonment offer an unparalleled window
into the economic circumstances of soon-to-be prisoners at exactly the time
that their involvement in criminal activities has brought them into contact
with the criminal justice system. The exact sequence of events leading up
to imprisonment has the potential to shed light on whether economic
distress in the form of unemployment or low wages while employed leads
to participation in crime or, conversely, whether participation in crime leads
to economic distress—a question with substantial implications for theories
of criminal behavior and criminal justice policy.
Early research on the relationship between economic conditions and
crime rates at the macro-level posited a strong positive relationship between
unemployment levels and aggregate crime rates.26 Most of these studies,
however, only found a rather modest relationship between these two
variables, indicating that while unemployment and crime may co-vary, the
variance in unemployment is both insufficient and insufficiently correlated
to explain the substantial changes that have occurred in the crime rate over
the course of the twentieth century when most research was conducted. 27
23
See Sabol, supra note 5, at 268–69; Tyler, supra note 19, at 242; LaLonde & Cho,
supra note 6, at 254; Jung, supra note 5, at 506.
24
LaLonde & Cho, supra note 23, at 249–50.
25
Jung, supra note 23, at 506.
26
Theodore G. Chiricos, Rates of Crime and Unemployment: An Analysis of Aggregate
Research Evidence, 34 SOC. PROBS. 187, 199 (1987).
27
See Freeman, Economics, supra note 12, at 3542. Scholars have also noted that
aggregate unemployment has the potential to increase the motivation for crime in the
population while simultaneously decreasing criminal opportunities. See David Cantor &
Kenneth C. Land, Unemployment and Crime Rates in the Post-World War II United States:
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At the individual level, stronger evidence of a relationship between
unemployment and crime has been reported. A number of different
longitudinal samples have all reported that employment is inversely related
to adult crime rates,28 with Sampson and Laub’s work suggesting a strong
negative correlation between job stability in early adulthood and subsequent
crime participation.29
Two challenges to the simplest interpretation of this work—that
economic difficulties contribute to criminal offending—have been offered.
The first challenge highlights the reciprocal and occasionally
complementary nature of employment in legal and illegal markets.30
Criminal acts and legal employment are not mutually exclusive ways of
spending time or making a living. Given the sporadic nature of criminal
offending, even income-generating criminal offending, participation in
crime does not preclude participation in legal employment.31 Furthermore,
legal employment can provide opportunities for criminal acts. The second,
and more direct challenge, comes from research that shows that many
individuals with more than minimal criminal involvement begin offending
early in their lives, becoming socially embedded in criminal or delinquent
social networks, which both increases the likelihood of criminal justice
involvement and decreases the likelihood of being in a subsequent position
to participate in the conventional labor market.32 The rapid declines in
legitimate employment observed among soon-to-be prisoners potentially
could speak to either of these schools of thought on the employment-crime
relationship, assuming that the temporal ordering of criminal act,
unemployment, and imprisonment can be reconstructed.
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 50 AM. SOC. REV. 317, 329 (1985). More recent
research, however, has suggested that changes in criminal opportunities explain very little of
the already small unemployment and crime relationship. See, e.g., Gary Kleck & Theodore
G. Chiricos, Unemployment and Property Crime: A Target-specific Assessment of
Opportunity and Motivation as Mediating Factors, 40 CRIMINOLOGY 649, 666 (2002).
28
Terence P. Thornberry & R. L. Christenson, Unemployment and Criminal
Involvement: An Investigation of Reciprocal Causal Structures, 49 AM. SOC. REV. 398, 400
(1984); Ann Witte & Helen Tauchen, Work and Crime: An Exploration Using Panel Data,
49 PUB. FIN. 155, 157 (1994).
29
Robert J. Sampson & John H. Laub, Crime and Deviance over the Life Course: The
Salience of Adult Social Bonds, 55 AM. SOC. REV. 609, 617 (1990).
30
Thornberry & Christenson, supra note 28, at 399; see also Freeman, Economics,
supra note 12, at 3543–44.
31
See Thornberry & Christenson, supra note 28, at 399; see also Freeman, Economics,
supra note 12, at 3543–44.
32
See John Hagan, The Social Embeddedness of Crime and Unemployment, 31
CRIMINOLOGY 465, 486 (1993) (arguing for the importance of adolescent crime and criminal
justice involvement for understanding future adult unemployment).
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The observed declines in employment prior to imprisonment have
implications not only for theories of criminal behavior, but also for criminal
justice policy. If imprisonment is preceded by a decline in employment, it
is possible that the criminally-involved are not as insensitive to the changes
in the labor market as previously thought.33 This could suggest that policies
designed to limit this rapid decline in employment or intervene earlier in
this decay process might be able to limit further declines in employment
and subsequent contact with the criminal justice system—an incredibly
costly outcome for all involved. However, the best test for such a
relationship is not whether employment decreases prior to imprisonment,
but whether employment decreases prior to the arrest leading to
imprisonment. The arrest is the clearest available signal of initial or
renewed criminal involvement through initial contact with the criminal
justice system. Employment declines prior to arrest would indicate that
unemployment might be contributing to criminal involvement. On the
other hand, the absence of employment declines prior to arrest would
reaffirm the perspective that an individual’s participation in criminal
behavior, even among individuals with connections to the formal labor
market, is not particularly sensitive to changes in labor market status.
Finally, the methodological implications of pre-imprisonment declines
in employment are not only of interest in their own right, but also because
the empirical reality of a precipitous decline in pre-imprisonment
employment and earnings has important methodological implications for
estimates of the labor market effects of imprisonment. If employment and
wage trends leading up to imprisonment change swiftly due to preimprisonment criminal justice contact or other endogenous events, then
conventional estimation strategies could produce biased estimates of the
effects of imprisonment.34
Within-person analytical strategies for
estimating the individual-level effects of imprisonment rely on stability of
the individual-level employment and wage trends prior to imprisonment to
estimate the implied or explicit counterfactual of what an imprisoned
individual’s life would have been like in the absence of prison. One
common solution to the estimation problems created by the declining preimprisonment wage trends is to compare prisoners’ post-release
employment and wages to their employment and earnings several quarters
prior to any short-term pre-imprisonment instability—an approach

33

Freeman, American Men, supra note 12, at 30–36; Freeman, Economics, supra note
12, at 3542–43.
34
See JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JORN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS
ECONOMETRICS 230 (2009).
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implemented and well-described in prior work.35 Such an approach,
however, requires the additional assumption that no confounding processes
are at work during the period of instability immediately prior to the
treatment of interest, in this case imprisonment. The presence of any such
confounding social processes would mean that prisoners, instead of being
observed before and after an isolated experience of imprisonment, would be
observed in a slightly but critically different counterfactual condition—
before and after receipt of a compound treatment consisting of arrest,
conviction, and possibly pretrial incarceration. An estimate of this
compound treatment may still have some theoretical value, as it captures
the effects of an entire cycle through the criminal justice system, but its
implications for penal policy are far less clear.
For all of these reasons, it is important to better understand why
employment and wages fall so rapidly in the quarters before imprisonment.
II. DATA AND METHODS
The data in this study were drawn from the electronic records of the
Circuit Court of Cook County (hereinafter Circuit Court). The Criminal
Division of the Circuit Court handles all non-federal felony criminal cases
originating in Cook County, Illinois.36 As such, cases range from retail
theft to homicide, although the majority of cases involve illegal drug
distribution or property theft.37 This distribution of cases is typical of large
urban county court districts in the United States, which have seen the
fraction of their caseloads devoted to drug cases increase steadily in the last
three decades.38
A sample consisting of all felony cases initiated in the Circuit Court
between 2000 and 2005 where the defendant was subsequently convicted
and sentenced to imprisonment was identified from the records of the Clerk
of the Circuit Court of Cook County (N=127,803).39 In order to avoid
contaminating the estimates of imprisonment’s effects on prisoner
employment with the effects of previous imprisonments, the sample of
cases was further limited to individuals who had not been sentenced to
imprisonment for the fifteen years prior to their first sentence to
35

See, e.g., LaLonde & Cho, supra note 6, at 248 (discussing methodology and
statistical model).
36
See BUREAU JUST. ASSISTANCE, REVIEW OF THE COOK COUNTY FELONY CASE PROCESS
AND ITS IMPACT ON THE JAIL POPULATION 4 (2005).
37
See Charles E. Loeffler, supra note 6, at 145.
38
THOMAS H. COHEN & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, BUREAU JUST. STAT., FELONY
DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COURTS, 2006, at 3 (2010).
39
BUREAU JUST. ASSISTANCE, supra note 36, at 35.
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imprisonment in the period between 2000 and 2005 (N=61,145). These
records were linked to statewide criminal history records using fingerprint
identifiers and supplemented with state quarterly UI-earning data for
sample members from the Illinois Department of Employment Security
(IDES).40 Because nearly half of sample members with either missing
necessary linking information or superficially-valid linking information
were found to have no evidence of any covered labor market activity, only
those sample members with some evidence of participation in the covered
labor market were included, as it would be impossible to distinguish
between non-participation in the covered labor market and unemployment
(N=32,656). Using the resulting employment information, indicators for
quarterly employment status (non-zero earnings) were calculated for each
sample member. Basic demographic characteristics for the final sample are
reported in Table 1. In general, the sample closely mirrors the population
of individuals sent from Cook County to the Illinois Department of
Corrections. Roughly 80% of the sample is African-American with the
remainder split almost evenly between White and Hispanic individuals.41
Only 10% of the sample is female. The average age of the sample is thirtytwo.
Because imprisonment removes prisoners from the conventional labor
market, most studies with longitudinal measures of employment calculate
quarterly employment and wage rates using synthetic or relative time,
where the entry into prison and the exit from prison form the end of the pretreatment period and the beginning of the post-treatment period,
respectively.42 This allows researchers to visualize the employment and
wage trends of multiple prisoners going into and out of a period of
imprisonment, something that would be impossible to do if these trends
were shown using actual chronological (calendar) time. Using this
approach, the substantial drop in employment leading up to entry into
prison has been routinely observed.43
Figure 1a replicates this finding using quarterly employment rates for
Cook County felony cases sentenced for the first time to the Illinois
Department of Corrections between 2000 and 2005. Since imprisonment is
presumed to have no effect on employment and wages in the period leading
up to imprisonment, one possible interpretation of this precipitous drop in
40

See Loeffler, supra note 6, at 147.
See Charles E. Loeffler, Estimating the Effects of Imprisonment on the Life-Course
(May 6, 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with author).
42
See, e.g., LaLonde & Cho, supra note 6, at 247; Kling, Incarceration Length, supra
note 5, at 867 (2006); Pettit & Lyons, supra note 5, at 240.
43
Harding et al., supra note 6, at 70–71.
41
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employment would be some selection process similar to that observed in
the literature on returns to job training.44 In those studies, pre-program
drops in employment were linked to selection into program participation
itself.45 Essentially, the recently unemployed workers sought out or were
referred to job-training programs as a result of their economic distress.46 If
this same logic held for soon-to-be prisoners, it would suggest that they too
were struggling economically prior to their arrest, conviction, and
imprisonment and that the criminal justice system caught them at the nadir
of a downward employment spiral. Due to the rarity of pre-arrest measures
in the criminological literature, this narrative is especially intriguing. If this
downward dip indeed signaled general difficulties among the soon-to-be
imprisoned, it would have significant implications both for expectations of
subsequent criminal activity and for the potential to develop more effective
criminal justice interventions through employment services, job training,
and other programs designed to increase labor market participation and
performance even among the population with repeated involvement with
the criminal justice system.
As intriguing as this hypothesis is, a more complete explanation for
the pre-imprisonment decline must take into account any potential negative
effects of arrest and pretrial incarceration on employment. As their cases
wind their way through the courts, the typical soon-to-be prisoner in Cook
County spends several months in pretrial custody.47 Even for those
individuals who are allowed to spend this period in the community on
pretrial release, the arrest event leading to eventual imprisonment may
sufficiently disrupt their labor market participation that the time from arrest
to imprisonment may nonetheless be an extended period of
unemployment.48
Furthermore, the period from arrest to eventual
imprisonment is filled with court hearings, which, independent of any
effects of arrest, may affect the likelihood of employment and the extent of
any earnings.49 If even one of these factors held true for the soon-to-be
imprisoned, then the pre-imprisonment decline in employment that was

44

See Heckman et al., supra note 8, at 1932; Ashenfelter, Effects, supra note 8, at 51
(reporting entry-into-training-program drops in employment); Ashenfelter & Card,
Longitudinal Structure, supra note 8, at 648 (illustrating the use and limitations of
longitudinal earnings data for the estimation job training program effects).
45
Ashenfelter, Effects, supra note 8, at 57.
46
Ashenfelter & Card, Longitudinal Structure, supra note 8, at 648.
47
BUREAU JUST. ASSISTANCE, supra note 36, at 35.
48
See Dobbie et al., supra note 14, at 214.
49
See id; see also Holzer et al., supra note 3, at 118.
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attributable to independent economic distress would be accordingly
diminished.
In order to test for the effects of pretrial case processing effects on preimprisonment employment, three different empirical tests were conducted.
The first test for the effects of pretrial case processing on pre-imprisonment
employment levels compares the pre-imprisonment employment levels as
measured from the quarter of entry into prison to the pre-imprisonment
employment levels as measured from the quarter of arrest eventually
leading to imprisonment. If the employment trajectories of the soon-to-be
arrested also manifest the geometric declines observed among the soon-tobe imprisoned, then positive selection may be at work. If, however, the
employment trajectories of the soon-to-be arrested are stable going into the
quarter of arrest, then it is much more likely that post-arrest/preimprisonment case processing are contributing to the observed geometric
declines in employment.
The second empirical test compares the pre-imprisonment employment
levels of the imprisoned more formally. Equation 1 defines Yit as a dummy
variable indicating a prisoner’s employment status in a given calendar
quarter.
captures the time-varying relationship between subsequent
imprisonment and the employment probabilities of sample members, where
time is calculated relative to imprisonment.
The relationship between employment and quarter relative to
imprisonment is estimated separately for each of the ten quarters leading up
to the first sentence to imprisonment for an individual sample member. For
all other quarters prior to imprisonment, the relationship is jointly
estimated. Also in equation 1,
is an individual-specific intercept and
is an independently distributed error time-varying error term. This equation
is then re-estimated with a dummy variable indicating whether the sample
member was incarcerated during a given quarter.
Quarterly preimprisonment incarceration status was imputed using each sample
member’s credit for time served awarded at the time of sentencing to
estimate the quarter in which they began earning credit towards any
eventual prison sentence. Due to the imprecision of this measure of pretrial
incarceration, with some small number of individuals not given credit for
periods of pretrial detention, it is likely that this estimator is a lower-bound
estimate on the effects of pretrial incarceration on pre-imprisonment
employment. Finally, the equation is re-estimated using an alternative time
definition. Instead of estimating relative to imprisonment, the equation is
re-estimated using time to arrest leading to imprisonment. For all of these
estimates, individual fixed effects and robust standard errors were used.
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The third empirical test examines the wage trends for individuals who
were employed prior to imprisonment. For this group, earnings trends
relative to the two alternative synthetic time definitions are graphed in order
to see whether wages conditional on employment in the period leading up
to arrest are changing as rapidly as wages during the period immediately
prior to imprisonment.50 If they are, this could mean either hours worked or
wages are changing. However, a rapid change in wages likely reflects a
change in the hours worked and the absence of any change in wages during
the pre-arrest period likely would mean that sample members are
experiencing neither additional distress nor changes in their time allocation
during the period prior to their contact with the criminal justice system.
III. RESULTS
The significant explanatory power of looking prior to arrest leading to
imprisonment as opposed to looking only prior to imprisonment itself can
be seen by examining synthetic time graphs using two different relative
time definitions—the quarter of arrest and the quarter of imprisonment
(Figure 1b). If the pre-imprisonment drop in employment extends back
beyond the quarter of arrest leading to imprisonment, then the attribution of
this decline to non-criminal justice contact factors (i.e., independent
economic distress) is strengthened. However, if no such pre-arrest drop is
observed, then the pre-imprisonment drop is almost certainly concentrated
in the period between arrest and imprisonment, suggesting that criminal
justice processes are the principal cause.
The pattern that emerges is one in which a substantial portion of the
pre-imprisonment drop in employment disappears when an earlier starting
date is used. Examining the trends for quarterly employment prior to the
quarter of arrest reveals little decay in employment rates until the quarter of
arrest. This suggests that the large pre-imprisonment employment drop
reflects a considerable quantity of post-arrest employment losses, which are
most readily explained by the adverse effects of some combination of
arrest, court appearances, pretrial confinement, and conviction. The
substantially smaller drop in employment in the quarters prior to arrest also
suggests that, unlike the pre-enrollment employment drops seen with many
job training programs, which are primarily reflections of lives in economic
distress, the employment patterns of soon-to-be prisoners are more
complicated. The otherwise relatively stable (albeit low) employment
patterns seem to be interrupted only slightly by independent economic

50

Wages are inflation-adjusted to 2009 dollars.
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troubles and much more substantially by the precipitous effects of arrest,
jail, and eventually prison.
This understanding of the employment situation of the soon-to-be
imprisoned is reinforced by the statistical tests of significance reported in
Table 2.
Beginning in the fourth quarter prior to imprisonment,
employment rates are significantly lower than the long-term trend for
sample members (Column 1). Employment rates are approximately 5%
lower four quarters before imprisonment, 10% lower three quarters before
imprisonment, 20% lower two quarters before imprisonment, and 50%
lower in the quarter prior to the quarter of imprisonment. Once a measure
of quarterly pretrial incarceration status is added to the regression equation,
the magnitude of the relationship between pre-imprisonment quarter and
employment is halved. The decline in the fourth pre-imprisonment quarter
is non-existent and even the decline in the quarter prior to the quarter of
imprisonment is reduced to less than 20% of the long-term trend. Still, the
basic trajectory of the pre-imprisonment decline in employment remains
across the four quarters prior to imprisonment, just at a lower level than was
observed when no effort was made to account for pretrial incarceration
status in the quarters before imprisonment.
Column 3 reports the results of the re-estimation of the regression of
employment status on dummy variables for the quarters leading up to
imprisonment, but instead of estimating relative to imprisonment, the
dummy variables represent the quarters prior to the arrest event leading to
eventual conviction and sentencing to imprisonment. In contrast to the
results reported in Column 1 and consistent with the graphical test reported
in Figure 2, employment rates relative to quarter of arrest are stable or
significantly above their long-term trends in all but the quarter of arrest
leading to eventual imprisonment. The absence of any significant decline
in employment in the quarters prior to arrest leading to imprisonment
provides the strongest evidence that pretrial events, be they jail, court, or
other, are responsible for the employment declines observed in the preimprisonment period. However, the fact that not all of the preimprisonment declines are absorbed by the addition of a measure of pretrial
custodial status—albeit an imperfect one—suggests that pretrial
incarceration may not provide a comprehensive explanation for preimprisonment declines. It is possible that conviction effects or other
endogenous events may offer explanation for this remaining decline in
employment.
Additional evidence in support of this perspective can be found in an
examination of quarterly earnings for prisoners employed prior to arrest and
imprisonment (Figure 2). Quarterly earnings for the employed are
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essentially flat throughout the period leading up to the arrest event leading
to imprisonment. This suggests that for the subset of soon-to-be prisoners
who are employed in the UI-covered economy, their labor market
performance is unaffected by their impending arrest. However, when
earnings relative to imprisonment are analyzed, another interesting feature
of the employment of the soon-to-be imprisoned emerges. As this group
experiences arrest events leading to pretrial incarceration, the employment
rate drops, but this mechanical increase in unemployment does not draw
evenly from the distribution of those employed in the previous quarter.
Instead, this new unemployment draws heavily from those workers with the
lowest reported wage earnings. This results in a rapid increase in average
earnings for those workers who retain employment until their eventual
imprisonment. Put simply, those prisoners with relatively higher paying
jobs or more regular job hours are able to maintain employment longer than
lower-paid and lower-working-hour workers.
Given that stable
employment is one of the factors considered by judges when deciding
whether a defendant should be held in pretrial custody, this result is to be
expected.51 Nonetheless, it provides a further indication that employment
and pretrial detention are negatively correlated.
IV. DISCUSSION
As far as we can tell from UI-based wage data, the soon-to-be
imprisoned do not manifest evidence that they are experiencing any more or
less economic distress than usual in the quarter leading up to the arrests that
lead to their eventual imprisonment. As such, it appears that their arrests
are uncorrelated with their formal labor market performance, which could
be considered as an otherwise random, albeit highly disruptive, event in the
economic and social life of the soon-to-be imprisoned. This raises the
question: why are arrests leading to imprisonment not preceded by more
signs of economic distress?
Several plausible explanations for this lack of pre-arrest economic
distress exist. First, it is worth reiterating that economic distress is the
norm for soon-to-be prisoners.52 Past studies using administrative data have
generated considerable evidence of economic distress both before and after
51
See Stephen Demuth, Racial and Ethnic Differences in Pretrial Release Decisions and
Outcomes: A Comparison of Hispanic, Black, and White Felony Arrestees, 41 CRIMINOLOGY
873, 881 (2003) (discussing theories of judicial decision-making).
52
ADAM LOONEY & NICHOLAS TURNER, BROOKINGS INST., WORK AND OPPORTUNITY
BEFORE AND AFTER INCARCERATION 1, 7 (2018), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/upl
oads/2018/03/es_20180314_looneyincarceration_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/WN2Y-U4XG].
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arrests leading to imprisonment.53 And even surveys of prisoners, which
show higher rates of employment (roughly 70%),54 presume such a high
rate of pretrial incarceration that they generally do not ask prison inmates
about labor market activity in the period between arrest and
imprisonment55—suggesting either an opportunity for additional research or
further evidence of the profoundly disruptive effect that pretrial
incarceration has on the economic lives of the soon-to-be imprisoned.
Second, it is also possible that legitimate earnings activity can be
accompanied by illegal activities. Numerous studies have shown that
illegal earnings can be intermittent, and part- or full-time employment in
the legal labor market has the potential to produce complementary wages.56
It is even possible that these two forms of employment are not simply
complementary opportunities to smooth inconsistent returns from illegal
earnings activity, but that legal employment can give rise to expanded
opportunities for illegal earnings through theft, drug selling, or other illegal
activity.57 Whether or not legal and illegal earnings are complementary, it
appears that participation in the legal labor market does not preclude
participation in illegal acts, which is just to say that criminal activities are
not limited to the unemployed. However, the reverse may not be true, as
suggested by John Hagan’s work on the social embeddedness of crime 58

53
See, e.g., LaLonde & Cho, supra note 6, at 246; Kling, Incarceration Length, supra
note 5, at 867–68; Loeffler, supra note 6, at 157; David J. Harding et al., supra note 6, at 68.
54
CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA & JENNIFER C. KARBERG, BUREAU JUST. STAT., DRUG USE
AND DEPENDENCE, STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONERS, 2004 1, 8 (2007).
55
BUREAU JUST. STAT., THE SURVEY OF INMATES IN STATE CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES
AND THE SURVEY OF INMATES IN FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES QUESTIONNAIRE (2004),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/sisfcf04_q.pdf. (source on file with author).
56
See Jeffrey Fagan, Drug Selling and Licit Income in Distressed Neighborhoods: The
Economic Lives of Street-Level Drug Users and Dealers, in DRUGS, CRIME, AND SOCIAL
ISOLATION: BARRIERS TO URBAN OPPORTUNITY 100, 129 (Adelle V. Harrell & George E.
Peterson eds., 1992) [hereinafter Drug Selling] (finding that legal labor market participation
competed with criminal work); see also Jeffrey Fagan, Women and Drugs Revisited: Female
Participation in the Cocaine Economy, 24 J. DRUG ISS. 179, 179 (1994) [hereinafter Women]
(finding that women involved in drug markets engage in a variety of income-generating
activities, both legal and illegal); Jeffrey Fagan & Richard B. Freeman, Crime and Work, 25
CRIME & JUST. 225, 234–59 (1999) (reporting that many criminal offenders engage in both
legal and illegal work in succession or often simultaneously); PETER REUTER ET AL., MONEY
FROM CRIME: A STUDY OF THE ECONOMICS OF DRUG DEALING IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 62–66
(1990) (discussing legal and illegal sources of income among individuals arrested on drug
charges).
57
See Jeffrey Fagan, Drug Selling, supra note 56, at 129.
58
See Hagan, supra note 32, at 486 (arguing for the importance of adolescent crime and
criminal justice involvement for understanding future adult unemployment).

832

LOEFFLER

[Vol. 108

and Richard Freeman’s work on crime and labor market participation.59
Both scholars suggest that rather than unemployment leading to crime,
participation in crime can lead to subsequent unemployment, where the
mechanism of unemployment can either be contact with the criminal justice
system or social selection into a trajectory of continued criminal
involvement largely disconnected from the conventional labor market. This
embedding or selection process, under this analysis, then restricts the ability
of crime-involved individuals to participate in the legitimate economy at
any future time at which they attempt to do so.
Regardless of why arrests leading to imprisonment are not preceded by
more signs of economic distress, the substantial and mechanical disruption
caused by arrest and pretrial incarceration suggests that future work on the
labor market experiences of prisoners could benefit from improved
measures of pretrial incarceration status. In fact, there are two distinct
benefits that could come from collecting and analyzing this additional
information. For the purposes of estimating the effects of imprisonment on
subsequent probabilities of employment and earnings, pre-imprisonment
information on prisoner employment and earnings is useful for estimating
the within-individual labor market effects of imprisonment. However, if
imprisonment is always or nearly always preceded by a precipitous drop in
employment and earnings, then typical empirical strategies for estimating
the effects of imprisonment on employment and earnings may misestimate
the true causal effects of imprisonment. Past employment and earnings are
time-varying confounding variables.60 As such, they are ill-suited for use in
a fixed effects regression research design, which assumes that fixed effects
will only be used to control for time-invariant differences between
individuals.
A lagged dependent variable estimation strategy offers a useful
alternative to fixed effects regression. By examining the employment
immediately before and after imprisonment, a comparison of quarterly
employment for the several quarters before imprisonment will compare
economic performance already lowered by arrest, pretrial custody, and
conviction to economic performance with the added effects of
imprisonment. While this may seem reasonable enough, this configuration
precludes the possibility of first measuring the lagged effects of arrest,
detention, and earnings, since these quantities are obscured by the nonlagged effects of subsequent imprisonment. Previous attempts to resolve

59

Freeman, Disadvantaged Youths, supra note 12, at 201.
For more details on time-varying confounders, see ANGRIST & PISCHKE, supra note 34,
at 113. For more details on prisoner reentry, see PETERSILIA, supra note 2, at 3–20.
60

2019]

PRE-IMPRISONMENT EMPLOYMENT DROPS

833

this problem by implicitly or explicitly examining non-imprisoned
individuals and comparing their trajectories to those of imprisoned
individuals rests upon the assumption that they share similar enough
economic trajectories to allow for an unbiased estimation of
imprisonment’s effects.61 Unfortunately, this assumption seems unlikely to
be true.62 The soon-to-be imprisoned are much more likely to experience
an extended period of pretrial detention than the non-soon-to-be
imprisoned.63 For these reasons, it seems that panel data of earnings for
prisoners are unlikely to provide an isolated estimate of the effects of
imprisonment and instead provide an estimate of the joint effects of arrest,
pretrial detention, conviction, and eventual imprisonment.
Collecting better information on the pretrial incarceration of prisoners
and the employment trajectories of incarcerated non-prisoners could also be
quite valuable for another reason. Studies of the employment experiences
of ex-prisoners have repeatedly noted a temporary employment boost
immediately after release from prison.64 The exact cause of this spike has
not been fully explored. It has been speculated that this could be due to
parole work requirements or other features of the prison reentry process.65
Having employment information on ex-jail inmates who are not then sent to
prison could help shed light on whether these employment spikes are a
function of the generic experience of incarceration or prison-specific
policies.

61

See, e.g., Western, Impact of Incarceration, supra note 2, at 528.
See Apel & Sweeten, supra note 6, at 459–62.
63
Marian R Williams, A Comparison of Sentencing Outcomes for Defendants with
Public Defenders Versus Retained Counsel in a Florida Circuit Court 23 JUSTICE SYSTEM
JOURNAL 249, 254 (2002).
64
Sabol, supra note 5, at 269; LaLonde & Cho, supra note 6, at 247; Jung, supra note 5,
at 507; Kling, Incarceration Length, supra note 5, at 868.
65
See Sabol, supra note 5, at 270, 291.
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Table 1. Means and standard deviations of variables
Black

0.79

Hispanic

0.11

White

0.10

Male

0.90

Age at Sentencing

32.31 (11.81)

Pre-Imprisonment
Employment Rate

0.23 (0.42)

Pretrial Incarceration Rate (as
measured by credit for time
served at sentencing)

0.95

Avg. Length of Pretrial
Incarceration (w/o zeroes)

159.17 (168.62)

Number of Observations

32,656

Source: Author calculations based on matched Circuit Court
of Cook County and Illinois Department of Employment
Security data.
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Table 2. Alternative estimates of pre-imprisonment
employment declines
Variables

Pre-Prison
Basic

Pre-Prison
w/

(1)

Timeserved (2)

Qtr. Prison
Entry or Arrest

-0.163
(0.002)***

-0.079
(0.003)***

-0.055
(0.002)***

1st pre-event
quarter

-0.096
(0.002)***

-0.051
(0.003)***

0.038
(0.002)***

2nd pre-event
quarter

-0.052
(0.002)***

-0.026
(0.002)***

0.062
(0.002)***

3rd pre-event
quarter

-0.023
(0.002)***

-0.007
(0.002)**

0.060
(0.002)***

4th pre-event
quarter

-0.011
(0.002)***

-0.000
(0.002)

0.061
(0.002)***

5th pre-event
quarter

-0.000
(0.002)

0.007
(0.002)*

0.061
(0.002)***

6th pre-event
quarter

0.007
(0.002)***

0.012
(0.002)***

0.061
(0.002)***

7th pre-event
quarter

0.015
(0.002)***

0.018
(0.002)***

0.058
(0.002)***

8th pre-event
quarter

0.019
(0.002)***

0.021
(0.002)***

0.056
(0.002)***

9th pre-event
quarter

0.020
(0.002)***

0.022
(0.002)***

0.053
(0.002)***

10th pre-event
quarter

0.023
(0.002)***

0.025
(0.002)***

0.042
(0.002)***

Time served in
quarter
Fixed Effects

Pre-Arrest
(3)

-0.120
(0.003)***
Yes

Yes

Yes
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Constant

0.234
(0.001)***

0.245
(0.001)***

0.228
(0.000)***

Person/quarter
obs.

1,066,852

1,066,852

1,066,852

Persons

32,656

32,656

32,656

R2
0.007
0.006
0.004
Notes: *** indicates coefficients were significant at 1% level.
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Figure 1a. Quarterly Employment from Time of Sentencing
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Figure 1b. Quarterly Employment from Arrest and Sentencing
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Figure 2. Average Quarterly Wage Earnings for Employed Soon-ToBe Prisoners
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